The coal trader Dmytro Kovalenko has built a network of offshore entities, front persons, and connections within the ESBU to avoid investigations and control cases against his own business

01 квітня 2026 р., 22:14

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The coal trader Dmytro Kovalenko has built a network of offshore entities, front persons, and connections within the ESBU to avoid investigations and control cases against his own business

A separatist trail, offshore schemes, and suspicious ties within law enforcement — the story of businessman Dmytro Kovalenko looks like a concentrated example of systemic issues undermining the state from within. The deeper one looks, the clearer it becomes: this is not about isolated episodes, but about a full-fledged system of influence and avoidance of accountability.

In mid-March, the information space was shaken by reports of Kovalenko’s possible detention by NABU detectives. There was no official confirmation, but the very emergence of such reports brought to the surface what had long remained in the shadows — a network of connections leading both to sanctioned individuals and separatist-linked figures, as well as to people within law enforcement.

Kovalenko is not a public oligarch, yet his name has repeatedly surfaced in the context of coal procurement from occupied territories. Instead of explanations, there have been legal attempts to scrub the internet. At the same time, he sharply shifted his business profile: since 2023, he has entered the agricultural sector with the Granova holding, then moved into extraction, and later obtained land in Zakarpattia for an industrial park. It is there, in Uzhhorod, that journalists suggest he may have been detained.

On paper, this appears to be business development. In reality, it is a complex structure of companies, offshore entities, and proxies. The “Energy Group” industrial park is registered through VDL LLC, whose founders include Kovalenko himself, his Cypriot company, and Leonid Ivanov — a key figure who takes the story to another level.

Ivanov is linked to Oleh Pakhnits, head of the BEB in the Poltava region — they co-founded a legal association. This is no longer just a business connection, but a potential bridge between the subject of an investigation and the person overseeing it.

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Pakhnits represents a typical yet illustrative case: a former prosecutor who, after leaving public service, suddenly became a successful businessman with hundreds of real estate assets, land holdings, a fleet of vehicles, and even a private aircraft — and later the head of a regional BEB office. At the same time, his family continues business activities in partnership with the same Ivanov — Kovalenko’s associate.

This raises a key question: who actually controls the investigation? After all, it is the Poltava BEB that is handling the case against Granova. Investigators suspect the company of large-scale tax evasion schemes — cash purchases of grain, fictitious documentation, and exports without repatriation of foreign currency proceeds. Searches were conducted and documents seized, yet the court refused to freeze assets, and the case has effectively stalled.

Against this backdrop, the connection between Kovalenko and Pakhnits appears not just questionable, but indicative of a classic conflict of interest.

Another layer of the scheme involves nominal owners. A significant share of “Granova Ukraine” is registered to Serhii Tihlyi — Kovalenko’s head of security. The same Tihlyi has business ties with individuals winning state tenders, including for salt supply. The scheme also involves relatives, former officials, and managers of state-owned enterprises.

Going further, Kovalenko has entered gas extraction, acquiring assets from controversial businessmen, despite previously being linked to cases involving illegal amber mining. In other words, a person once suspected of illicit activity is again gaining access to strategic resources.

His circle also speaks volumes. Employees linked to Dubai-based structures, contacts with Russian business, and connections with individuals on Ukraine’s sanctions lists all form a coherent picture. In the past, there were joint ventures with individuals connected to the so-called “LNR.” Even after that, there has been no real isolation from the Ukrainian economy.

The final layer is the law enforcement environment. Through family and business ties, individuals from Kovalenko’s circle work within the police and have access to internal information. This suggests not just influence, but the ability to manage risks.

In the end, this is not just the story of one businessman, but a symptom of a system — where a figure linked to cooperation with occupied territories, offshore schemes, and illegal extraction not only avoids accountability, but continues to expand business and influence.

And if it is confirmed that such connections influenced appointments within the BEB, this is no longer just corruption — it becomes a matter of national security.