Serguey Asael Shinder built a corporate fraud pipeline: fake workers got inside, copied secrets and drained millions

A high-profile investigation into a network of cybercriminals who had been trading data from major companies for years has caused a major stir.

Following the publication, the scheme’s participants began cleaning up the internet, deleting materials and covering their digital tracks. Therefore, we are republishing the investigation to preserve the information they are trying to erase and to raise awareness of the scheme that has threatened companies across Europe for over a decade.

Among those whose data may have fallen into the hands of scammers are VTB Bank, Fidelity, Virgin Media, KLM, Ford, Symantec, Fujitsu, Deutsche Post and dozens of other well-known companies.

Hacker attack or internal sabotage? What’s behind the scandalous leak of classified data from SoftServe?

Not long ago, the IT and digital industries were rocked by a major scandal: SoftServe, one of Ukraine’s largest IT companies, was allegedly hacked. The attack resulted in the largest data leak in the history of Ukrainian IT.

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The stolen data included confidential order data from major clients, including contract values and proprietary technical data on client projects, as well as source code for client products. Furthermore, personal data of SoftServe employees, contractors, and employees of some major clients was also compromised—copies of 200 passports were leaked online. More details about the incident can be found here.

However, a number of curious nuances in this story raise the question: did the attack actually occur? And if so, was it carried out from outside? And finally, did SoftServe’s management have accurate information about who they had actually voluntarily granted access to their proprietary information and personal data?

We’ll attempt to answer all these questions as part of our editorial investigation. Let’s begin by examining the theories that have already been aired, "hot on the heels."

In a comment to AIN.UA, cybersecurity consultant Yegor Papyshev offered his opinion on the possible causes of this incident. One possibility is that it was a contract from a competing company, which would cause a colossal blow to SoftServe’s reputation. The other possibility is that it was the actions of a motivated cybercriminal group pursuing mercenary goals through blackmail.

The expert is confident that, whatever the attack’s purpose, it would have involved an insider within the company, as only the latter could have provided the hackers with a successful vector for carrying out a cyberattack in such a secure structure.

But where did such an insider come from, and how did he gain access to the classified internal data of a major IT corporation? Apparently, SoftServe itself "let the fox into its own henhouse."

As Antikor discovered during its investigation, members of the recently exposed "wolf pack" of internet fraudster Sergei Shinder worked at the affected company. But let’s take things one step at a time.

Shinder’s List

 

It is not known exactly when the Russian-born programmer Sergei Asael Leonidovich Shinder (Serguey Shinder) came up with the idea of a virtual agency to provide software development services.

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Apparently, the idea matured and honed over several years, when Sergey was forced to toil on his own, working for various companies. It’s safe to assume that, along with a thirst for profit, it was driven by some combination of his love of detective stories and the need to delegate work to other specialists, due to his own lack of programming knowledge. 

As he gained experience and skills, he began to uncover loopholes and weaknesses in corporate systems, work organization, and hiring processes. News of his colleagues’ successes likely contributed to this.

And then, one fine day, a daring plan formed in his head, which Sergei began to put into practice.

Imagining himself an elusive genius, he created and headed a sort of international cooperative of programmers, specializing in sub-outsourcing without the knowledge of the hiring companies. And what a convenient prospect – the IT sector is growing by leaps and bounds, with thousands of startups opening daily, and the demand for skilled workers is simply incredible! Even the fact that a huge number of young, talented IT professionals graduate from universities and schools every year, dreaming of reaching the pinnacle of success, doesn’t satisfy the talent shortage. But many of them simply don’t know how to market themselves profitably. And that’s where our hero and his loyal comrades – experienced, carelessly cash-squandering programming sharks – enter the arena. For the immature young graduate, who, due to his lack of experience, is not trusted with serious projects and is not paid well, this is the very embodiment of professional success and simultaneously the key to it. All it took was casting the right bait, and a flood of IT vacancies from all over Russia, Ukraine, Europe, and America began to flow toward Mr. Shinder.

The demand for programmers was so high that employers often completely ignored even the most basic security measures. For example, they granted access to internal corporate systems, servers, and source code repositories without any serious background checks on the programmer being hired. Furthermore, employers almost never had any control over who was actually working on the project.

In Goldoni’s famous comedy "The Servant of Two Masters," the cunning rogue Truffaldino from Bergamo managed to serve two masters simultaneously, while they were unaware of his schemes. Sergei Shinder decided to follow a similar path. His only upgrade was to quietly delegate his work to so-called "programmer-slaves" willing to work for peanuts. And how can you delegate your work without your employer knowing? The right way—secretly (and obviously illegally) by handing over to these notorious IT "slaves" access to the corporation’s software source code, internal systems containing documentation, secret keys, and passwords to servers and databases (hello, SoftServe!).

The scale of the scheme was so vast that our hero’s gang of IT fraudsters with Russian, Belarusian, and Ukrainian roots, using IT "slaves," successfully defrauded companies across Europe and North America for over a decade. As the editorial team discovered, the victims included such giants as VTB Bank, Fidelity, Virgin Media, KLM, Kuoni, Ford, Symantec, Fujitsu, DeutschePost, Three, Tesco Mobile, Liberty Global, and dozens of other well-known brands.

But what if this were simply a clever deception and the illegal acquisition of commercial and technical data? In most cases, even with IT "slaves," the work was not completed on time, and quality was not maintained, leading to the disruption of expensive projects and enormous losses for companies. After all, as it turns out, Shinder’s scheme was designed not to fulfill the employer’s business objectives, but to create the appearance of work and extract as much money as possible over as long as possible. By any means necessary.

But if, in pursuit of profit, you’re willing to sink someone else’s company, if you consider everyone a sucker and yourself an unrivaled and elusive schemer, such impunity may one day prove costly. And then the system you’ve built will collapse with a terrible crash.

The Fall of a Fraudulent Engineer

That’s exactly what happened to our would-be scammer. At some point, almost simultaneously, several reputable recruiting agencies, as well as employers, reached the breaking point, suffering serious reputational and financial losses. The trigger was Sergey’s missteps with several IT companies over the past few years. The victims noticed something outright shady was happening with their system access. For example, a supposedly super-specialist from the Kyiv region, Odesa, or Kharkiv would work from Germany or the UK on Monday, and from Moscow or distant Siberia the rest of the week. The coronavirus only heightened suspicions, as this continued to happen even with borders completely closed. When asked why this was happening, the scammer offered various outlandish theories, which were not confirmed upon closer inspection. Furthermore, his entire scheme was exposed in all its glory! 

At the corporate level, the scandal failed to be resolved or hushed up, and all the dealings of the "IT Moriarty" gradually began to emerge, and the tangled web unraveled further and further. The number of defrauded companies grew steadily at such a rate that the community of HR, technical, and general directors of IT companies began actively exchanging information, adding the names of other cooperative participants to blacklists. Do you think Sergei Leonidovich has stopped? Not likely. It seems he has chosen the path of aggressive defense and has no intention of abandoning his lucrative scheme for defrauding corporations.

Catch Me If You Can… or Shinder’s Scheme in Section

We’ll also delve into his operating principles and methods, as well as his insidious system, which remained undetected for years and penetrated the deepest corners of leading corporations. Perhaps this investigation will shed more light on what exactly happened at SoftServe and other affected companies and why. And it will protect others from dangerous connections.

In the first part of our article, we suggested that the group of IT fraudster Sergey Shinder was likely behind the massive data leak at SoftServe. Moreover, what happened there closely resembles his usual method of parting ways with employers who refuse to play by the cooperative’s rules. So what are Shinder’s rules, which he has been extracting tribute from leading corporations for years, and how did he manage to dupe dozens of top managers and HR professionals across Europe, the CIS, and even North America?

The path of a swindler

Perhaps Comrade Shinder could have become a brilliant broker, filling vacancies from dozens of employers, finding capable workers, ensuring high-quality completion of the required work on time, and earning a profit, which he shares with his assistants. Perhaps, in such a scenario, everyone would be happy, and the cooperative could prosper forever. Perhaps…. Unfortunately, however, talent often clashes with virtue, and when greed, the thirst for profit at any cost, and impunity are present, it inevitably leads to tragedy.

This is exactly what happened in our story. By comparing all the information gathered through our editorial interviews with the affected companies and HR specialists, we were able to reconstruct the pattern that underlies the cooperative’s operations. It seems likely that everything boiled down to this: take on as many projects as possible, far exceeding the practical capabilities of the cooperative and its IT "slaves," and squeeze the employer’s nominal salary for as long as possible. Until they are fired for poor results or the lack thereof.

Typically, the scheme worked like this. While the employer has, for example, 3-4 "elite" senior-level developers, led by a leader, hired and paid full-time, one or two junior-to-middle-level IT "slaves" work part-time on the project. Each IT "slave" is simultaneously involved in several projects. This orgy continues until the enraged/confused/frustrated employer simply fires the cooperative members. By this point, the fees for uncompleted work are withdrawn, and the team moves on to new achievements. According to the editorial staff, this is the theory currently being pursued by foreign investigative agencies as a priority.

As the tangle of threads unraveled, the victims of Sergei Shinder’s actions, and the public, were confronted with a nearly perfectly constructed web, where everyone had a role to play, where all processes were coordinated from a single center, and where threads entangled every nook and cranny of the network.

There was also an "elite"—so-called "hunters" close to the boss, who were hired by the boss to fill open positions and manage the work of the so-called IT "slaves." Among the hunters were experienced programmers fluent in foreign languages, who could have easily worked honestly and lived comfortably, but, unfortunately, chose the path of deception. And then there were the numerous IT "slaves"—mostly young programmers who, mostly for the promises of advancement and material well-being, toiled for the benefit of the system as long as their strength and patience lasted. One "slave" was replaced by another. And this entire army could change repeatedly, while, according to the contract, only Sergey Shinder or someone from his elite circle supposedly worked on the project. Only the accounts for accessing corporate systems and the client’s software source code remained unchanged. In short, it was a walk-through.

Foxes in the henhouse - expect trouble

This wasn’t a simple theft of employee databases, a hooligan hack of a government website or a celebrity’s Twitter account, or even a boring bitcoin theft. Our scammers gained access to all vital corporate systems, source code, documentation, databases, secret accounts, passwords, and keys to the servers of the companies that hosted them. Without the client’s knowledge, the scammers transferred this entire data set to their own virtual machines on various hosting providers, where they created the appearance of work. This also served as insurance against particularly zealous clients. For a time, it also allowed the gang to conceal their true locations.

It’s worth noting that the big boss himself wasn’t resting on his laurels, counting his profits, but was actively and proactively involved in the fieldwork. In particular, as the investigation revealed, Sergei Shinder, right up until the system’s collapse, liked to personally apply for jobs with several companies simultaneously, skillfully manipulating his resume, social media accounts, job search portals, and other personal information. Moreover, the physical locations of the companies in different countries never posed a problem for him. Holding an Israeli and several other visa-free passports, he traveled the world virtually freely before the pandemic.

Methods and techniques for processing victims

According to HR representatives and managers at companies where Shinder was exposed, he was a true virtuoso of psychological pressure and manipulation. Somehow, using a whole arsenal of techniques and cunning tricks, he managed to wring working conditions for himself that allowed him to maintain the appearance of working for as long as possible without delivering the desired results. Although, from time to time, he also resorted to more banal tactics—kickbacks to favored managers.

He stopped at nothing to support his schemes. For example, his favorite ploy to explain delays or to switch to remote work where office work was initially required was the news of a close relative’s terrible illness, requiring him to be constantly by their side. This "sick" relative was often the Great Schemer’s wife, Victoria Georgievna Shinder (aka Victoria Sulakova), a loyal ally whose role in the pyramid scheme was invaluable.

Naturally, most employers went along with the swindler’s schemes and allowed themselves to be deceived for long periods. Thus, the savvy businessman could "work" for several months simultaneously at dozens of companies, earning a substantial salary from each. If any suspicions or accusations of fraud arose, Shinder could play the role of an aggrieved "victim of arbitrary action," unfairly treated by heartless capitalists, or he could turn into a dangerous troublemaker, threatening the company with legal action for allegedly failing to fulfill contract terms. Threats to publish software source code openly were also common, non-disclosure agreements be damned. Needless to say, in most cases, the companies he defrauded were happy to hush up the matter, rather than cause further scandal and suffer reputational losses with clients and partners. Who would risk fighting an "experienced" IT professional who’s "seen all your laundry," knows all your passwords, access details, and has copies of your databases and source code? They’d prefer to get rid of such a person quietly, without confrontation, and would even be willing to pay a "penalty." Apparently, finding themselves in a similar situation, SoftServe tried to hold the scammer accountable, and they paid the price.

A favorite method was to infiltrate their people into a large project, concealing any connection between all members of the underground community. This allowed them to deceive their employer as much as they wanted. After all, if one programmer delayed the work, the other cooperators would always assure them that everything was going well, but there were serious difficulties that they had to heroically overcome. In such a situation, it’s best not to interfere, lest the entire project fail.

Naturally, to be successful in their scams, the gang’s actions, at least initially, had to be backed by actual work assignments. And the tasks were completed, but only as long as the IT "slaves" hired by Shinder were qualified to perform them, or until Shinder stopped paying these same programmers.

It remains to be seen that due to such a disregard for their "contractors"—ordinary programmers—dozens of talented freelance developers have had extremely negative experiences, leading to increased mistrust and mutual suspicion in the labor market.

Furthermore, the editorial board’s sources in law enforcement agencies confirmed that a number of international requests for legal assistance from foreign investigative agencies have already been received regarding members of Shinder’s underground organization and their big boss.

Our youth team

Now it’s time to name all the members of Sergei Shinder’s cooperative, as well as their addresses, passwords, and other information taken from open sources.

Head of the cooperative: Sergey Asael Leonidovich Shinder, date of birth: 04/22/1975, citizenships: Ukraine, Russian Federation, Ireland, Israel, Bulgaria

Location: difficult to determine due to inconsistencies in the cover story told to the affected companies. Sometimes in Kyiv, sometimes outside of it, sometimes in another country entirely. Judging by information from the affected companies, he is constantly on the move (running away while he can or searching for new victims? Even during a pandemic?).

Distinguishing characteristics: very self-confident, professionally inflates his own value. He often freezes during conversations. This lasts from a few seconds to a minute, akin to a communication defect or stutter. He often gets through interviews by searching for answers on Google, exploiting his "freezing." He is very aggressive towards colleagues and superiors. If someone offends him with a comment about the quality of his work or the overall lack of results, he immediately begins complaining to his superiors or surreptitiously using other methods to eliminate the offender, including bringing in "assistants" to, at a minimum, denigrate or even eliminate the offender. He avoids video calls, offering any excuses.

Contacts:
Email: serguey.shinder@gmail.com
Skype: sshinder
Telegram: @sshinder
Viber, WhatsApp, Telegram:
+380682830314
+380678135889
+380919191406
+79632998154
+353876338384
+359877005478
+359877005477

Data for Ukraine: Shіnder Sergey Asael Leonidovich, foreign. passport: FE519721
FOP Shinder Sergiy Asael Leonidovich, tax payer code: 2750526234
https://5140.org/fop/4461016-shinder-sergij-asael-leonidovich

Data for the Russian Federation: Shinder Sergey Asael Leonidovich, passport of the Russian Federation: 2720846899, foreign. Russian passport: Serguey Shinder Asael (756149761)
Individual Entrepreneur Sergey Asael Leonidovich Shinder, INN 100131126539
Active Individual Entrepreneur (it is clear that he is a citizen of the Russian Federation, registered at the address: Kaliningrad, Musorgsky Street, 10a): 
https://egrinf.com/ip11980689

Liquidated Individual Entrepreneur (it is clear that he is a citizen of Israel, was registered in Petrozavodsk, Moskovskaya Street, 12a): 
https://egrinf.com/ip5434653

The same, Ireland:
Serguey Asael Shinder, passport: PE5150978
Lynxoft Technologies Limited, company number: 550297, address: 14 Shackleton Square, Lucan, Co Dublin, Ireland
https://app.duedil.com/company/ie/550297/lynxoft-technologies-limited 
Present in the register of registered companies: https://search.cro.ie/company/CompanySearch.aspx

The same, Czech Republic:
Company: SIMAREX sro 
https://www.podnikatel.cz/rejstrik/simarex-sro-27257568/
The register shows that Šinder and his wife were executive directors at SIMAREX sro in the period from 18.05.2015 to 19.05.2019.
The address used during registration: Pitkjarantskaja 16, Apartment 107, Petrozavodsk, Karelia, Russian Federation.

Online profiles:
https://www.linkedin.com/in/serguey-shinder-4487882/ 
https://www.linkedin.com/in/serguey-shinder-a198505/ (was deleted during the investigation) 
https://www.xing.com/profile/Serguey_Shinder 
https://www.xplace.com/u/sshinder 
https://rocketreach.co/serguey-shinder-email_61262672 
https://gust.com/companies/golfmiles (as, allegedly, technical director)
https://people.bayt.com/serguey-shinder-23129384/ 
https://github.com/selshin

Shinder Victoria Georgievna (Sulakova Victoria, Shinder Victoria)

The big boss’s wife, loyal ally, and companion. Date of birth: April 3, 1972. Nationalities: Ukraine, Russia, Ireland, and Bulgaria.

Location : Difficult to determine due to inconsistencies in the cover story Sergey Shinder tells his employers. Sometimes it’s Kyiv, sometimes outside of Kyiv, or even in another country entirely. In Ukraine, she’s known as Victoria Georgievna Sulakova (she didn’t change her last name in Ukraine, apparently deliberately).

Distinguishing features: Apparently, he acts as a treasurer. He appears only as the recipient of payment for Sergei Shinder’s "work."

Contacts:
Viber, WhatsApp, Telegram: +380678135889

Data on Ukraine: Viktoria Georgiyivna Sulakova, foreign. passport FE519806 
FOP Sulakova Viktoriya Georgiivna, payer code: 2639122703, 
https://5140.org/fop/2565414-sulakova-viktoriya-georgiivna

Data on the Russian Federation: Sulakova Victoria Georgievna, foreign passport Shinder Victoria (754460744, 754396259), Sulakova Victoria (753286255, 724307415)

Online profiles: appear to be missing.

Hunters (S. Shinder’s confidants) are capable developers who excel at interviews and interacting with target companies, delegating some or all of their work to IT "slaves." They may also delegate communication in corporate chats to the most talented "slaves."

Furthermore, they can use any names and resumes from public sources, creating problems for people unaware of how their resumes and names are being used. Affected companies have documented cases of identical voice actors using different names, where Sergey Shinder provided developer search services under the guise of HR or posed as a representative of a large IT company with which, in reality, he had no connection.

Polunin Andrey Yuryevich (Andrii Polunin, Andrew Polunin), date of birth: April 25, 1986 

Citizenship: Ukraine.

Location: Odessa, Ukraine

Distinguishing features: very self-confident, speaks good English, and negotiates wages like a bazaar, driving up his price. According to victims, depending on his personal interests, he can understand the project and supervise IT "slaves."

Contacts:
Viber, WhatsApp, Telegram: +380674819383
Email: apolunin@gmail.com
Skype: aypolunin

Data for Ukraine:
FOP Polunin Andriy Yuriyovich, tax payer code: 3152619191
https://5140.org/fop/2411330-polunin-andrij-yurijovich

Online profiles:
https://www.linkedin.com/in/andriipolunin/
https://angel.co/u/andrii-polunin

Loktev Eduard Mikhailovich (Edvard Loktev, Eduard Loktev

Date of birth: 06.02.1990, Citizenship: Belarus, Russian Federation

Location: Minsk, Belarus or various cities in Ukraine.

Distinguishing features: According to victims, depending on his personal interests, he can understand the project and supervise IT "slaves." He speaks good English. He passes interviews partly by searching for answers on Google. He rarely appears in Ukraine.

Contacts:
Email: edvardloktev@gmail.com
Skype: edvard.loktef

Data on Belarus:
Individual Entrepreneur (Belarus, UNP 192752145): 
https://statuspro.by/service/unp/192752145
https://www.bizinspect.by/inst/5c1fc12437b6871c5c2a7a76  
Individual Entrepreneur (Belarus, wife, UNP 193386657): https://statuspro.by/service/unp/193386657

Data for the Russian Federation: Loktev Eduard Mikhailovich, Russian passport: 6610540831, foreign. Russian passport: Loktev Eduard (531001411)

Online profiles:
https://www.linkedin.com/in/ed-qa-auto/ https://stackoverflow.com/users/8356850/edvard-loktev 
https://vk.com/loktevem

Eduard Luhtonen

Nationality: Finland, Russia. Date of birth: July 5, 1968

Location: Aargau, Switzerland or Helsinki, Finland or various cities in Ukraine.

Distinguishing features: rather unsure of behavior and speech. Good English. Seems to pass interviews by searching for answers on Google. Minimal involvement in the project and minimal oversight of IT "slaves," according to information from affected companies. Almost never appears in Ukraine.

Contacts:
Viber, WhatsApp, Telegram: +358452320895
Email: edufinn@gmail.com
Skype: luhtonen

Data for Finland:
Infro Oy (liquidated 06.04.2020), company number 2360535-2.
https://vainu.io/company/infro-oy-taloustiedot-ja-liikevaihto/716591/henkilosto 

Online profiles:
https://www.linkedin.com/in/eduardluhtonen/
https://vk.com/luhtonen
https://luhtonen.github.io/about/
https://twitter.com/eluhtonen
https://medium.com/@eluhtonen/about
https://stackoverflow.com/users/1882414/eduard-luhtonen
https://ok.ru/eduard.luhtonen

Why did this become possible?

The media sometimes publishes materials about high-level scammers.

The exposure of Sergei Shinder’s gang is undoubtedly a sensation, and not just in the IT world. It’s a significant and significant event for the development prospects of the entire IT sector, as well as for hiring principles, approaches to internal security, and HR practices.

The example of Shinder’s group, which milked its victims for years, demonstrated how vulnerable and helpless even the largest and most sophisticated corporations can be to the talent and cunning of fraudsters. According to preliminary estimates, companies suffered losses of over $20 million due to their collaboration with the scammers.

The unfortunate SoftServe data breach, which affected leading global brands, demonstrated that negligence and inattention when hiring employees with access to confidential data are unacceptable! After all, access to source code and corporate systems by the "wrong person" can lead not only to a loss of image, time, and money, but also to complete ruin and the actual collapse of your entire enterprise.

The investigation is gaining momentum…

We continue our investigation, trying to help as many victims as possible, including SoftServe, piece together the story of what happened or has already happened. The number of affected companies has already exceeded ten in Ukraine alone! If Sergey Shinder and his gang have already swooped in on your company, you’ve become their powerless IT "slave," or you’ve suffered at the hands of these scammers by standing in their way, please contact us at shgnginvestigation@protonmail.com

Please note: We recommend saving the investigation data, as scammers make every effort to erase all traces of their schemes. All photos, data, and profiles are taken from public sources.

Shinder Sergey Asael Leonidovich (Serguey Asael Shinder, Serguey Shinder)

Shinder Victoria Georgievna (Sulakova Victoria, Shinder Victoria)

Polunin Andrey Yuryevich (Andrii Polunin, Andrew Polunin)

Loktev Eduard Mikhailovich (Edvard Loktev, Eduard Loktev)

Eduard Luhtonen

Business app

SECURITY CASE: HOW TO AVOID BECOMING A VICTIM OF IT SCAMMERS

Those who have been scammed have developed a set of rules and conditions that must be followed to protect yourself and avoid falling victim to this type of scam. These rules are broken down into specifics. By strictly following each point, you’ll be 90% safe from falling into the clutches of a scammer.

IT Candidate Interview Guidelines

1. Check profiles on social networks (Facebook, Instagram, VKontakte, Odnoklassniki, Twitter, etc.), business social networks (LinkedIn, Xing, My Circle, etc.), and freelance exchanges (Upwork, Freelancehunt, etc.) for discrepancies with the location, place of work, and professional skills described in the resume.

2. If the candidate’s skills on their resume exceed those required by the job posting, it’s worth asking why they’re willing to take on such a job and aren’t committed to a salary that matches their skills. There’s a good chance they won’t have much time to devote to your project.

3. Pay attention to how the candidate responds during the interview. If a candidate frequently freezes when answering general and technical questions, mutes their microphone, or gives nonsensical answers while simultaneously typing (trying to Google the answer), and then their answer quickly turns from nonsense to actionable, it’s best to avoid hiring them.

4. If during the conversation it turns out that, by "lucky coincidence," a candidate (or current employee) has several connections who are ready to jump in the moment a vacancy opens, this should raise red flags. You should thoroughly check the other candidates to ensure their backgrounds match: how they know each other, what projects they’ve worked on, and so on. Be especially wary when this happens in a rather persistent manner.

5. If a developer requests payment to be sent to the account of their wife or relative, it’s important to carefully verify the authenticity of the connection, requesting the relevant supporting documents. It’s also worth paying attention to the location of the bank listed in the bank details.

Rules for hiring an IT specialist for a company manager

1. Request supporting documents (passport copy, registration copy, sole proprietor/sole proprietor/company name) for verification. This is especially true if the developer is working for your contractor. Otherwise, there’s a high risk of getting into trouble if your contractor doesn’t bother to request copies of the documents themselves.

2. The contract must be signed with at least a digital signature. Having only a scanned copy of the signatures will not help in the event of fraud on the developer’s part, but will only make the situation worse.

3. Carefully monitor deadlines, task progress, and work results. If a developer consistently delays tasks without a valid reason, you have a problem.

4. If a developer or their relative suddenly becomes ill, documents confirming the illness and family ties should be requested and verified. This is especially relevant for companies that hire employees for office work, especially if the developer insists on being transferred to remote work, either temporarily or permanently.

5. If a developer consistently misses necessary calls, refuses to turn on video, is very slow to respond to messages, their spoken English begins to exceed their written English, and they become insolent and aggressive at the slightest criticism, refusing to acknowledge any problems, you have a very big problem.

Rules for IT developers – “How to avoid becoming an IT slave” to a scammer

1. The absence of a signed cooperation agreement and relying on word of mouth leads to very high risks and financial consequences. If an online search about the person you’re communicating with reveals a vacuum or discrepancies in information, it’s highly likely you’re dealing with a scammer. When entering into an agreement, always verify the person’s passport information if the agreement is with an individual, and the company’s documents if it’s with a legal entity.

2. If you are asked to work while being allowed to use corporate accounts under someone else’s name, or, conversely, if someone wants to use your documents and name while doing the work themselves, then it’s worth asking about the legality of what is happening and the consequences of complicity. (https://dev.by/news/china-partner-2)

3. When a new colleague encourages you to work in their place or lie to your manager about the real state of affairs, it’s worth considering the potential consequences. The scammer may try in every way to turn you against your colleagues and, especially, your superiors.

4. Scammers tend to lull their victims into a false sense of security. Don’t fall for the hype of getting rich quick, helping you move to a developed country, or getting a job at a major foreign company.

5. If you do fall for the scammers’ tricks but only find out about it later, you should quit under any circumstances. Be sure to document all communications with your client. If you receive threats or any hints of threats, the first step is to contact the police and notify the affected company of the situation.